I wrote some time earlier about the challenges of playing Austrians in 1805 under Throne & Altar rules. The experience is clearly different from that of playing Russians, and it is fair to say, I think, that man for man the Austrians are more difficult to use well. At the same time John has expressed some views on the utility of Russians based on his experience in the campaign. Some of these I think are insightful and some perhaps less so. Let me offer my view from above...
Like the Austrians, the Russians do not play the same way as the French. What is it that makes the Russians distinctive, and what is the way to take advantage of those special characteristics? I suggest that there are four things that set the Russians apart. Two of these are a matter of a special rule that apply specifically to Russians (a bit like the no-support rule for the Austrians, although that is not unique to them). Another is a matter of historical orders of battle, and the third (closely related) is a matter of command structure. The right question is: Does the game reflect the historical reality appropriately?
The Austrians have a rule that, before 1809, greatly limits their ability to provide mutual tactical support. There is no doubt that this makes Austrian armies at these dates "worse", compared to other armies. I think, though, that it is a reasonable reflection of Austrian tactical doctrine, which was not designed around large-scale combined arms co-operation. There are many examples to be taken from historical accounts that support this - Haslach-Jungingen, in 1805, springs immediately to mind.
The Russians for their part have a special rule that makes them less prone to breaking (this is based largely on French accounts of facing them in Poland in 1807). There is likewise no doubt that this makes Russian armies "better". Again, the question is whether it reflects historical reality, as opposed to pro-Russian propaganda. Interestly, as I write this, I am listenting to a Too Fat Lardies podcast (Oddcast #46) in which one of the questions discussed is the justifiability of national characteristics in wargames. The gist of the answer (and similar to the one I would give myself) is that such rules must be justified by historical sources, and like any historical interpretation such justification must take into account the prejudices and biases of the sources. Such characteristics do not reflect the innate racial characteristics of the respective nations (I, for one, do not believe in such things) but the social conditions, terms of enlistment, training and equipment of troops, none of which is identical across different armies.
My inspiration for this rule, as it happens, comes not from Russian accounts of their own toughnesss, but chiefly from French accounts of fighting the Russians, particularly during the campaign of 1807. Again and again they exclaim at the steadfastness of the Russian troops on the battlefield, standing up to punishment that would send other troops running, and also at the Russians willingness after being beaten on the field to come back for more only a short time later. Subject to further information and argument, I am inclined to think that this is a justified representation of Russian drill and discipline.
The effect this has on the game is that you can safely rely on Russians to hold fast in the face of sudden shocks more often than other troops. They will still fail due to fatigue in the end, but a single great roll on the part of the enemy is less likely to cause them to fail immediately.
Skirmishing
Before 1812, all Russian infantry suffers a -1 penalty on ranged fire. This does not mean that Russians were bad at musketry (the great Suvorov had emphasised training in musketry drill) but that their training and doctrine was weak in the area of light infantry and skirmishing. The Russian standard musket was reputed to be the worst and most clumsy in Europe - OK, perhaps, for line work, but not so much for light infantry. Unlike the western European nations they had had no colonial wars in the new world to fight, and unlike the Prussians had not had to find ways to deal with Austrian light infantry in the previous century. Like the Austrians, though, they had had a long-standing feud with the Turks - this had been the genesis of the Austrian grenzer tradition. Be that as it may, the Russians had no reputation as light infantrymen. Is it just to penalise them in this way? Arguably not, for there is no text that I can point to to settle the question. In part I have put this rule in to balance the moral advantage, but it is also on the strength of persisten rumour. I am open to persuasion.
For the time being, though, it means that Russians do not want to get into a skirmishing contest with any other nation. If an enemy comes into skirmishing range of a Russian line there are two appropriate reponses. One is to use the presumably interspersed artillery bases to blow them away with cannister. If the artillery is lacking, and if the availability of PPs allows it, the other option is the bayonet. Just remember as a Russian commander that getting into extended infantry firefights at 300 yards will no do you any favours.
Artillery
As a matter of historical record, Russian armies of this period were very artillery-heavy. They routinely fielded five tubes per thousand men where Napoleon, despite his love of the artillery arm, never managed even half that. The first effect on the game is to change the look of OOBs. Russian OOBs will have a higher proportion of artillery bases, and stronger ones. Tactically, this means that the artillery can be used more readily to break up enemy attacks, using artillery interrupt fire to slow down primary attackers and strip off supporters. The combination of this with the morale effect above makes Russians very strong in defence.
In attack the artillery can still be used to break up the enemy, of course, but once the infantry is within striking distance they are likely to mask supporting artillery, unless the artillery is up in the line with them. Achieving that is not easy, since the movement rate for foot artillery is noticeably slower than infantry. Slowing down the attack to the speed of the artillery is one problem with this approach, and the other is that having that much artillery in your attack line limits the amount of infantry that can be there. The large amount of artillery is therefore much less useful if the Russians can be lured into adopting the tactical offensive (by engaging them in a skirmishing contest, perhaps).
Command Structure
The Russians were slow to adopt the French Corps structure. Armies before 1812 tend to have a single commander above the divisional (or column) level. In addition the individual divisions tend to be both stronger and less numerous than those of their enemies. What does this mean for the game? Less Priority Points overall is what it means, so you know in advance as a Russian commander that you will get less done overall. On the other hand, that smaller number of PPs are all in the hands of a single commander. This in turn means that the Russian general can generally overpower the his opponent's intiative (as expressed in PPs) in any one area, whether that is in seizing control of the turn clock or in moving a particular (strong) division. There are a couple of approaches that can be taken.
In defence, the Russian can sieze the turn clock, run it down fast, and reserve all the rest of his points for micro-managing individual brigades to just where he wants them at the end of the turn. The French will get a pulse or two of movement, but he should be able to stifle them fairly quickly, so that unless they co-ordinate very well, most of their plans will go unrealised.
In attack, the points will have to be devoted to a single division. Pick the biggest, meanest, toughest division in the army and point it at the place you want destroyed in the enemy line. Then power it with all the PPs you have. They will go there.
What this means in general is that Russians do not do intricate, complex plans with lots of moving parts that need to come together just right. They pick one thing, and do it. Just do it. It will be done.
No comments:
Post a Comment